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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff/Appellant Jeff Mannor (hereinafter "Jeff') appeals the District Court's award of 
$8,144.98 in attorney's fees and costs after the dismissal of Jeffs Complaint for Partition of 
Real Estate and Sale (hereinafter "Complaint") on summary judgment. Jeff is not appealing the 
District Court's dismissal of the Complaint. Jeff is challenging the District Court's award of 
attorney fees of $5,700, as well as a subsequent supplemental award of fees and costs of 
$2,444.98, pursuant to an attorney fee clause in the parties' stipulated Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce (hereinafter "Decree"). 
B. Statement of Facts 
The genesis of this dispute lies in an award of real property to Defendant/Respondent 
Patricia Marmor (hereinafter "Patricia") in the Decree entered in 2009. The Decree awarded 
Patricia, as her sole and separate property, the community residence on 304 E. Scopes Owl Drive 
in Kuna, Idaho (hereinafter the "Property"). (R. at 56). Paragraph 15 of the Decree states: 
15. Transfers to Wife. Husband shall, and by Stipulation he has transferred, 
assigned and conveyed to Wife as her sole and separate property, and forever 
waives any and all rights in and to, the items more particularly described as 
follows: 
15.01. Wife shall be awarded the marital property located at 304 E. Scopes Owl 
Dr., Kuna, Idaho. Wife shall make a good faith effort to refinance the property 
within 180 days of the date of entry of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce in this 
matter at a comparable interest rate and/or payment amount. Wife will be 
responsible for all mortgage payments associated with this property. Husband's 
name shall remain on title until the refinance is complete. In the event Wife 
defaults on any mortgage payment she agrees she will cure the default within thirty 
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(30) days or vacate premises. If the default is not cured the house will be placed on 
the market for sale by Husband and Wife. The parties shall co-operate fully in 
listing, showing, and signing any and all documents required to sell the property 
for any offer received at the then fair market value as determined by an 
independent appraiser. Wife will receive the entire proceeds from the sale minus 
costs and fees and maintenance fees paid by husband minus any rents received by 
husband prior to sale. 
(R. at 56). As stated in Paragraph 15, because the parties were both obligated on the mortgage, 
Patricia agreed to make a good faith effort to refinance the property in order to remove Jeff from 
the mortgage obligation. (R. at 56). Over the next several years, Patricia was unable to complete 
a refinance. (R. at 84). This action followed. 
C. Course of Proceedings 
On November 28, 2012, Jeff filed his Complaint in District Court. (R. at 5-44). Count 
One of the Complaint sought a declaratory judgment that Jeff and Patricia each had a joint tenant 
interest in the Property. (R. at 10). Count Two sought an order that the Property be immediately 
refinanced or that it be sold. (R. at 11). While Jeff alleged in Paragraph 11 of the Complaint that 
he was a ''joint tenant with an undivided 50% interest in the real property," (R. at 7), he did not 
disclose anywhere in the Complaint that Patricia received the property as her sole and separate 
property in the Decree. (R. at 56). 
Patricia moved for summary judgment. (R. at 45). Patricia argued that under Idaho law 
the clear and unambiguous language of the Decree awarded her the Property as her sole and 
separate property. (R. at 76-78). Therefore, a partition action, which can only be brought under 
LC. § 6-501 when cotenants hold property as "parceners, joint tenants or tenants in common," 
failed as a matter of law and should be dismissed. (Id.). Patricia further contended that under 
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Idaho law the property division in the Decree was final and res judicata, and that the District 
Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to modify its provisions. (R. at 78-79). 
Jeff filed two affidavits (but no brief) in response to Patricia's Motion, which affidavits 
dealt exclusively with the dispute between Patricia and Jeff over the refinancing of the Property. 
(R. at 83-104). At the hearing, Jeff contended he remained a co-owner of the real property. (Tr. 
Feb. 11, 2013, at p. 15, LL 1-13). He contended the Decree conditioned Patricia's separate 
ownership on her successfully refinancing the property because the Decree stated his name 
remained on title. (Id. at pp. 16-17, 24). Jeff argued the Decree evidenced an intent that Jeff 
would remain a co-owner and could file a partition action in the event the refinancing was not 
completed. (Id. at p. 19). Jeff's counsel acknowledged at the hearing on summary judgment that 
all Jeff sought was to be released from any liability on the mortgage, which could be achieved 
via a refinance or a sale. (Id. at pp. 24-25). 
The District Court summarily dismissed the action from the bench, ruling that "if the 
plaintiff in this case believes that the defendant has not fulfilled her obligation under the divorce 
decree, the remedy lies there in the magistrate's division." (Id. at p. 33). Judgment was entered 
on March 8, 2013. (R. at 113). 
Within fourteen days of entry of final judgment, Patricia filed a Memorandum of Costs 
and requested her attorney fees. (R. at 115-121). Her basis was Paragraph 31 of the stipulated 
Divorce Decree, which states: 
Each party shall bear their own attorneys fees and costs for this action, provided 
however, that in any proceeding brought or defended in the future by either party 
to enforce the terms of this stipulation, in any court, including state, or federal 
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bankruptcy court, the substantially prevailing party in that proceeding shall be 
entitled to recover their costs, including attorneys fees. 
(R. at 60). 
Jeff filed an objection and argued that the action was just filed to "enforce property 
rights," not the terms of the stipulated Decree. (R. at 128-129). Jeff claimed that because the 
action was brought in district court it "could not possibly involve the enforcement of the decree, 
because enforcement of the decree is not within the district court's jurisdiction." (R. at 128). 
The Court disagreed and awarded fees pursuant to the attorney fee clause in the Decree, 
focusing on the broad language mandating such an award "in any proceeding . . . to enforce the 
terms" of the stipulated Decree. (Tr. Apr. 22, 2013, at p. 11, LL 11-15). A Judgment and Order 
for Costs and Fees was entered on April 25, 2013. (R. at 140-141). 
Then, without filing a notice of appeal or posting a supersedeas bond, Jeff filed a motion 
to stay execution of the judgment. (AR. at Exh. A). Patricia objected. (AR. at Exh. E). After a 
hearing, the Court denied the motion, ruling from the bench that there was "no good cause for 
departing from th[ e] traditional procedure" that a stay is issued upon the posting of adequate 
security. (Tr. May, 23, 2013, at p. 9, LL 2-5). 
After the notice of appeal was filed and the bond posted, Patricia filed a supplemental 
memorandum of fees and costs on June 6, 2013. (AR. at Exh. K). Patricia requested fees incurred 
in litigating Jeff's objection to her memorandum of costs. (Id.). Patricia also requested fees 
incurred responding to Jeff's attempt to stay execution of a money judgment without posting 
security. (Id.) Again Jeff objected, arguing that the fees were "outrageously high" and that part of 
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the request was untimely. (AR. at Exh. L). Jeff contended Cosho Humphrey, LLP either 
intentionally "inflated" their fees to achieve a "windfall" for Patricia or was doing its client a 
"drastic disservice by charging such extraordinary fees." (Id.) Jeff also contended the fees 
incurred in litigating the award of attorney's fees should be disallowed because the supplemental 
memorandum sought fee incurred in litigating the fee award, but was not filed within fourteen 
days of the April 25, 2013 Judgment of Attorney Fees and Costs. (Id.). 
The Judge overruled Jeff's objection and awarded all the fees requested, in a 
Memorandum Decision and Order. (AR. at Exh. 0). The District Court found that the 
supplemental memorandum was timely filed, citing case law approving an award of fees incurred 
in litigating a fee request, reasoning that "the prevailing party may supplement its attorney fee 
memorandum to include the costs incurred in securing its fee, and that a supplemental 
memorandum relates back to the date the original memorandum of costs was filed." (Id.) Jeff 
then filed an amended notice of appeal challenging the District Court's ruling on the timeliness 
of the supplemental memorandum but not the Court's ruling on the reasonableness of the fees. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL 
A. Patricia should be awarded her attorney fees and costs on appeal 
Patricia should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against 
this appeal, pursuant to Paragraph 31 of the Decree. The parties agreed that "in any proceeding 
brought or defended in the future by either party to enforce the terms of this stipulation, in any 
court . . . the substantially prevailing party in that proceeding shall be entitled to recover their 
costs, including attorneys fees." (R. at 60). Jeff's appeal fails to demonstrate any error in the 
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District Court's interpretation of the plain language of the attorney fee provision in the Decree, 
or the District Court's decision that the supplemental memorandum was timely filed. Therefore, 
Patricia should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
III. ARGUMENT 
This is a simple case involving the interpretation of an attorney fee clause in the parties' 
stipulated Decree. The District Court properly interpreted the relevant provision and correctly 
awarded fees because the facts are clear that Jeff filed an action to enforce the Decree and lost. 
Jeff does not challenge the fact that Patricia was the prevailing party. He does not challenge the 
District Court's ruling that the fees were reasonable. Rather, Jeff argues that his partition action 
was not about enforcing the Decree and so fees cannot be awarded under the attorney fee 
provision of the Decree. Jeff's argument contradicts the plain language of the attorney fee clause, 
is contrary to the relief requested in his own pleadings, and is contradicted by his counsel's 
admissions in open court. The District Court correctly interpreted the attorney fee clause of the 
Decree. Likewise, the District Court correctly related the supplemental memorandum of costs 
back to the date of the filing of the original memorandum of costs. The District Court's 
judgments awarding attorney's fees and costs should be affirmed. 
A. The District Court correctly interpreted the attorney fee clause of the Decree in 
awarding Patricia her attorney's fees 
In awarding fees, the District Court relied on the following term in the parties' stipulated 
Decree. 
Each party shall bear their own attorneys fees and costs for this action, provided 
however, that in any proceeding brought or defended in the future by either party 
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to enforce the terms of this stipulation, in any court, including state, or federal 
bankruptcy court, the substantially prevailing party in that proceeding shall be 
entitled to recover their costs, including attorneys fees. 
(R. at 60). 
lbis Court has held that the ordinary rules of contract interpretation apply to the 
interpretation of divorce decrees. Toyama v. Toyama, 129 Idaho 142, 144, 922 P.2d 1068, 1070 
(1996) (citing Delancey v. Delancey, 110 Idaho 63, 65, 714 P.2d 32, 34 (1986)). The Court 
stated in Page v. Pasquali, 
Construction of the meaning of a contract begins with the language of the contract. 
If the contract's terms are clear and unambiguous, the determination of the 
contract's meaning and legal effect are questions of law and the meaning of the 
contract and intent of the parties must be determined from the plain meaning of the 
contract's own words. 
150 Idaho 150, 152, 244 P.3d 1236, 1238 (2010) (quoting Elliott v. Darwin Neibaur Farms, 
138 Idaho 774, 779, 69 P.3d 1035, 1040 (2003)). 
At issue here is the term in the Decree stating that "in any proceeding brought or 
defended in the future by either party to enforce the terms of this stipulation," the prevailing 
party would be entitled to attorney fees and costs. Although Jeff now stretches at every chance to 
re-characterize the case he filed, the facts are that Jeff filed this action to enforce the terms of the 
parties' Decree. Any fair reading of his Complaint shows the crux of the matter was Patricia's 
alleged non-compliance with at term of the stipulated Decree, the refinancing requirement in 
Paragraph 15. Jeffs counsel admitted oral argument on Patricia's Motion for Summary 
Judgment that the case was filed to force Patricia to refinance the loan and that ultimately that 
was all Jeff wanted. (Tr. Feb. 11, 2013, at p. 24, LL 15-25, p. 25, LL 1-14 ). In dismissing the 
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action, the District Court found that Jeff should have the magistrate court adjudicate Patricia's 
alleged non-compliance with her obligation to refinance the loan. (Id. at p. 33). Jeff's position 
now that the action had nothing to do with the Decree, but was instead just an attempt to enforce 
property rights by seeking a partition of the property, cannot be sustained by the basic facts of 
the case. Jeff's argument ignores the very purpose and thrust of the case he filed. 
First, as set forth below, Jeff's entire Complaint revolved around this refinancing 
requirement. For example, Jeff alleged the following: 
16. Plaintiff and Defendant Marmor divorced on or about May 2009 wherein 
Defendant Marmor was ordered, pursuant to the Stipulated Property Settlement 
Agreement, to refinance the Property within 180 days of the Decree of Divorce. 
17. Despite Plaintiff's repeated requests Defendant Marmor has failed to take any 
steps to refinance or sell the Property. 
(R. at 8). 
Notably, in Count Two "Partition of Real Property," Jeff gave four reasons for seeking a 
sale instead of a partition in kind. Reasons (2) through (4) were: 
(2) Defendant Marmor has been either unwilling or unable to refinance the 
property as stipulated to in a 2009 Property Settlement Agreement between the 
parties, (3) so long as Plaintiff remains obligated on the debt service associated 
with the Property Plaintiff does not have the financial resources necessary support 
an additional mortgage and is thus precluded from property ownership, ( 4) 
Defendant Marmor has been unwilling to refinance or cooperate with the listing 
and sale of the Property 
(R. at 9). 
Most importantly, in Jeff's Prayer for Relief he asks as to "Count Two-Partition of Real 
Property" for: 
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4. An order and judgment that the real property be immediately refinanced, 
removing the Plaintiff from any and all debt service obligations, or that the real 
property by {sic J sold and that the proceeds of the sale and any other 
encumbrances be paid, together with the costs and expenses of this action and the 
sale of the Property, and the remainder then be divided between the Plaintiff and 
Defendant in accordance with their respective interests and rights under the 
Property Settlement Agreement. 
(R. at 11) ( emphasis added). 
After making these allegations, and after expressly asking District Court to order Patricia 
to immediately refinance the property, Jeff made the perplexing argument to the District Court 
that this case "could not possibly involve the enforcement of the decree." (R. at 128). What's 
more, Jeff continues his mischaracterization of the case in this Court. He claims that he only 
asked the Court to order Patricia to refinance as an alternative. Jeff states "Although Mr. Marmor 
did request a refinance, this request was done as an accommodation in the alternative of a full 
partition sale that he was entitled to under law." (Appellant's Br. at 5). Jeff claims "[n]owhere in 
the pleadings did Mr. Marmor request any relief pursuant to the terms of the divorce decree ... 
. " (Id.). These statements directly contradict the precise relief sought in the Complaint and ignore 
that the sale of the property was actually in the nature of alternative relief. Jeff asked for an order 
that the "real property be immediately refinanced, removing Plaintiff from any and all debt 
service obligations, or that the real property by [sic] sold .... " (emphasis added) (R. at 11). 
Jeff's argument on appeal is exactly opposite of how he framed his Complaint. There is 
no question Jeff was seeking to enforce the Decree. The term "enforce" means "to give force or 
effect to" or "to compel obedience to." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). The refinancing 
requirement was a creature of the Decree. Jeff sought to give effect to it and compel Patricia's 
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obedience to her obligations under the Decree. When Jeff formed a belief that this requirement 
was not being met, he chose a partition action as a vehicle to enforce that requirement-holding 
the possibility of a forced sale of the property as a stick to achieve his goal. Jeff cannot now take 
the position that he was just seeking to enforce some amorphous property rights, that he just 
"requested declaratory relief to clarify his rights to the property." (Appellant's Br. at 5). The 
entire thrust of this dispute and his lawsuit turned on the refinancing requirement in the Decree. 
Further, Jeff's counsel admitted this case was filed to prompt Patricia to refinance the 
Decree and that this was ultimately all Jeff sought. At oral argument on Patricia's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the following colloquy took place: 
THE COURT: Well, ultimately the relief that - or the claim that is being made is 
that the defendant has failed to fulfill her legal obligation in making a good faith 
attempt to refinance or otherwise get your client's name off the debt instruments, 
essentially, and so that he is no longer in any way, shape, or form liable on the 
mortgages on this place. 
That's ultimately all he wants. Right? 
MR. FOGG: Correct 
THE COURT: And having failed to persuade or otherwise force or persuade his 
ex-wife to get on the ball and refinance this place or sell it or whatever, just pay 
off these two notes with his name on them, he just wants an order ultimately from 
me finding that this house has to be sold and all the proceeds can go to her as soon 
as the lienholders are paid off. 
MR. FOGG: Disposed of. Whether that is a refinance in her name or a sale 
doesn't matter. And to continue maybe, I think the question is coming, because of 
her failure to fulfill her obligations, it's not her sole and separate. Because it's not 
her sole and separate, he has a right to partition. 
(Tr. Feb. 11, 2013, at p. 24, LL 15-25; p. 25, LL 1-14). 
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These comments by Jeff's counsel directly contradict his current argument that he never 
sought to enforce any term of the decree. These comments, made at oral argument on summary 
judgment, are an admission that this case was about enforcing the Decree. 
Second, Jeff's argument that the parties actually contemplated a partition action in the 
event refinancing was not obtained does not change the basic purpose of his case. Jeff argues at 
length that a forced sale clause was purposefully left out of the Decree because the parties 
contemplated a partition action in the event Patricia failed to obtain a refinance. This argument is 
an attempt to somehow divorce Jeff's partition action from the Decree in order to shield his case 
from the attorney fee clause. Jeff constructs a theory that the parties purposefully chose to leave 
out a sale order because Jeff could always just file a partition action, emphasizing the sentence 
"Husband's name shall remain on title until the refinance is complete." (R. at 56). 
Never mind that the Decree contains an integration clause stating it was the "entire 
understanding of the parties." (R. at 91). Or that the property was transferred to Patricia as her 
sole and separate property in the Decree, with not a mention anywhere of Jeff continuing to hold 
an interest as co-tenant. (R. at 56). Or that under Idaho law "[i]n the absence of an appeal from 
an original decree of divorce, the property division portions of that decree are final, res judicata, 
and no jurisdiction exists to modify property provisions of a divorce decree." McBride v. 
McBride, 112 Idaho 959, 961, 739 P.2d 258, 260 (1987) (citing Sullivan v. Sullivan, 102 Idaho 
737, 639 P.2d 435 (1981)). What's more, his partition action was dismissed and Jeff never 
appealed that dismissal. Thus, he argues at length that action was valid because he was a co-
owner, yet never appealed the District Court's dismissal of the Complaint. 
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But even assuming Jeff is correct that the parties contemplated a partition action and that 
such an action could be filed, it still remains true that Jeff would be seeking to enforce the 
Decree and his rights thereunder. While his interpretation of the Decree is questionable, it is 
ultimately irrelevant to the ultimate finding that Patricia is entitled to her attorney's fees under 
Paragraph 31. Whether Jeff chose a partition action or a contempt action, or any other action, he 
would still be seeking to enforce Patricia's obligations, and his rights, under the Decree. At heart, 
his argument that a partition action was contemplated by the parties but yet was not a term of the 
decree is a tortured analysis with one goal: avoiding the attorney fee clause in the Decree. 
Third, Jeff's argument that he could not have brought suit in district court seeking to 
enforce the decree because that issue is properly brought before the "family court" is flawed. The 
attorney fee provision is broad and covers "any proceeding." (R. at 60). It does not carve out 
disputes arising out the Decree that a party seeks to resolve in the wrong court. That is essentially 
what happened here. Jeff's contention that because the District Court has no jurisdiction to 
enforce a divorce decree, he could not possibly have been trying to enforce the Decree, ignores 
one other possibility: an action filed in the wrong court. Simply because Jeff labeled his action a 
"Complaint for Partition" and filed it in district court does not change the substance of what he 
sought. The parties' rights and remedies vis-a-vis the former community property are found in 
the Decree. By seeking to adjudicate those rights, Jeff sought enforcement of the Decree. The 
Court ruled that his remedy should be pursued in the magistrate court. The fact that Jeff chose 
the wrong court should not be held against Patricia. 
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In sum, the broad attorney fee clause in the Decree unambiguously covers this action. Jeff 
filed a partition action to force Patricia to refmance the loan on the Property awarded to Patricia 
in the Decree. Her obligation to refmance was a term of the Decree. As made clear in his 
affidavits and argument in District Court, Jeff believed Patricia was not complying with her 
obligations under the Decree and chose a partition action to force her hand. When he lost, Jeff 
shifted gears to avoid an attorney fee award and argued the action was just a simple action to 
enforce "property rights." Jeff's argument that he was not seeking to enforce a term of Decree 
cannot be sustained. 
B. The District Court correctly ruled Patricia's supplemental memorandum of 
costs was timely filed 
Patricia's Supplemental Memorandum was timely. The parties agreed that attorney fees 
and costs incurred in "any proceeding" would be borne by the non-prevailing party. (R. at 60). 
That broad language encompasses costs and fees incurred on post-judgment motions, especially 
when one of the motions filed was an unnecessary motion to stay collection of a money 
judgment during a pending appeal, filed and heard before Jeff had posted the required security. 
Patricia's supplemental request for fees sought to an award of fees incurred in litigating Jeffs 
objection to the first memorandum of costs as well as fees incurred responding to Jeffs 
unsuccessful motion to stay execution of the judgment. Jeff's objection in District Court was 
limited to the award of fees incurred in litigating the fee award because the supplemental 
memorandum was filed within the fourteen days of the order denying Jeffs Motion to Stay 
Execution. 
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Jeff's argument, unsupported by any case law, fails to consider that supplemental cost 
bills are specifically allowed under this Court's precedent. See Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 
746, 185 P.3d 258 (2008). In Lettunich, the non-prevailing party challenged the district court's 
award of attorney fees for litigating the amount of the fee award. Id at 752, 185 P.3d at 264. 
The contract at issue, a settlement agreement between the parties, provided for an award of 
attorney fees to the prevailing party in any action to enforce the terms of the agreement. Id The 
Court held that where the prevailing party has a legal right to recover attorney fees in the action, 
"litigation over the amount of the attorney fee award is also part of the legal action for which he 
is entitled to an award of attorney fees." Id Even more importantly, the Court characterized the 
continuation of the litigation over attorney fees as "part of the legal action to enforce the terms of 
the agreement." Id. 
As the District Court correctly held, Jeff's position that Patricia's supplemental 
memorandum was untimely cannot be reconciled with this Court's ruling in Lettunich. Rule 
54(d)(5) states: 
At any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the court, any party who 
claims costs may file and serve on adverse parties a memorandum of costs, 
itemizing each claimed expense, but such memorandum of costs may not be filed 
later than fourteen (14) days after entry of judgment. Such memorandum must 
state that to the best of the party's knowledge and belief the items are correct 
and that the costs claimed are in compliance with this rule. Failure to file such 
memorandum of costs within the period prescribed by this rule shall be a waiver of 
the right of costs. A memorandum of costs prematurely filed shall be considered as 
timely. 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(5). 
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Thus, a party seeking fees and costs is required to file a memorandum of costs and fees 
within fourteen days of entry of judgment. Any supplemental request for fees ought to relate 
back to the date of that filing. Under Jeff's theory, any fees incurred by a prevailing party in a 
post-judgment proceeding that resulted in an order-not a judgment-would not be compensable 
as the Rule refers to entry of judgment. A "judgment" means a "separate document entitled 
Judgment or Decree." Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(a). "A judgment shall state the relief to which a party 
is entitled on one or more claims for relief in the action. Such relief can include dismissal with or 
without prejudice." Id "A 'judgment' is '[a] court's final determination of the rights and 
obligations of the parties in a case." Neighbors For Responsible Growth v. Kootenai County, 147 
Idaho 173, 178, 207 P.3d 149, 154 (2009). A judgment is "the law's last word in a judicial 
controversy." 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 1 (2006). Considering there are a number of post-
judgment motions that can be filed and litigated, the District Court correctly related the 
supplemental filing back to the date the original memorandum of costs and fees was filed-
hence, the use of the term "supplemental." Otherwise, fees incurred litigating any number many 
post judgment motions would never be compensable because the fees would almost always be 
incurred more than fourteen days after entry of the final judgment. 
In sum, Rule 54 contemplates an initial filing within fourteen days of the entry of final 
judgment. Post-judgment litigation is also compensable under the case law. In this case, Jeff 
agreed to be responsible for the costs incurred by Patricia in any proceeding to enforce the terms 
of the Decree if he did not prevail. This agreement was not limited in any way and plainly covers 
all fees and costs, not just those incurred up to the entry of judgment. 
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IV. JEFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AW ARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
Jeff requests attorney's fees pursuant to Paragraph 31 of the Decree and I.C. § 12-121. In 
other words, Jeff argues his appeal of the District Court's decision that the partition action was a 
proceeding to enforce the Decree is itself a proceeding to enforce the Decree. This "heads I win, 
tails you lose" argument is misplaced. And since Jeff has not demonstrated any error on the part 
of the District Court requiring reversal he is not entitled to attorney's fees under the Decree. 
Finally, Jeff's request for fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 lacks merit. This statute 
authorizes the Court to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal, not as a 
matter of right, but only where the Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously or without foundation. Thompson v. Pike, 125 Idaho 
897, 876 P.2d 595 (1994). Despite the fact that Patricia prevailed on every single motion filed in 
District Court, and successfully obtained a dismissal of the Complaint on summary judgment, 
Jeff claims her "use of the divorce decree [to seek fees] lacks merit and foundation." 
(Appellant's Br. at 9). Thus, despite being the respondent on this appeal and the prevailing party 
on every issue below-including the dismissal of the Complaint, a decision that Jeff did not even 
choose to appeal-Jeff contends Patricia's defense of this appeal is frivolous and without 
foundation. The Court should reject this argument. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The District Court's Judgments awarding attorney's fees and costs should be affirmed. 
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